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The philosophical problem of meaning. The philosophical problem of meaning
is put into new light by the growing interest in artificial intelligence and the following
questions gain new relevance. Do symbols need to have meaning? If they do, then what
does it mean for them to have meaning? How can symbols refer to objects in the outside
world, if the agent doesn’t have access to the outside world and only has access to its own
sensory perceptions? How can symbols refer to concepts that are not grounded in sensory
perception (e.g. abstract concepts such as Hilbert space)? How can an agent judge the
truth of various symbolic statements?
Symbol grounding. In cognitive science this is known as the symbol grounding prob-
lem. Nagel argued [5] that the nature and quality of subjective meaning and phenomenol-
ogy is hardly accessible by rigorous scientific methodology. This can be interpreted as
saying that the meaning of a symbol is private to the interpreter and the connection
between the meaning and the symbol is (scientifically) unclear (e.g. meaning of the word
“love”). Further, Searle introduced [6] his famous Chinese room argument to show that
A.I. which is based solely on symbol manipulation cannot have intrinsic meaning. This
argument was further developed by Harnad who compared it to the problem of “Chinese-
Chinese dictionary” for someone who doesn’t know any Chinese characters [2]. This is
when Harnad formulated the symbol grounding problem. The many attempts to solve it
include theories of sensory-motor grounding [3], Wittgensteinian language games [7] and
statistical symbol covariations [4]. The latter are also critisized on the grounds of the Chi-
nese room problem. It has been argued [1, 8], however, that all the existing approaches
make a semantic commitment; that is the designer, or the programmer inputs some mean-
ing into the agent from outside on which the agent builds up the “autonomous” meaning,
which is, alas, not autonomous anymore, because it is based on this in-built semantic
commitment.
From meaningless to meaningful I would like to argue that the problem of Chinese-
Chinese dictionary is not avoidable and instead of avoiding it, one must solve it, i.e.
how does meaning emerge from meaningless symbols? Classically, meaning is understood
through the semiotic triangle:
Compare this to the situation in classical mathematical logic, where the symbol is a for-
mula in the formal (e.g. first-order) language, referent is the model and concept is the
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meaning attached by the mathematician to the formula. But as we argued, there is no
referent or concept from the point of view of the agent, at least not before the concept
is formed and the meaning is created. There are only information streams coming from
different senses, and perhaps being output through various modalities such as motorics.
This is the problem not only faced by the philosophers of mind, but also by the program-
mers when trying to create an autonomous A.I. Intuitively these information streams will
more generally correspond to inputs and outputs of individual neurons; inputs coming
from different senses such as vision, audition, haptics; Higher level frameworks such as
narratives and explanations of various things in different contexts as in “I do not only
see the table, but I also know why it is here, what it’s social role and how it is produced
etc.”. Thus, I suggest that the information streams can take any of the three roles in the
triangle. Using the classical logic as an illustration, we want our definition to be such that
there can be a satisfaction relation |= so that information streams can be put on different
sides of it: Each modality is a set M of states ϕ and a satisfaction relation |=M which is
a relation in the set {((M,ϕ), ψ) | ψ ∈M ′} where M ′ ranges over other modalities.
The research was supported by the Academy of Finland through the project WBS 1285203.
References
[1] R. Cubek, W. Ertel, and G. Palm. A critical review on the symbol grounding problem
as an issue of autonomous agents. In KI 2015: Advances in Artificial Intelligence,
pages 256–263. Springer International Publishing, 2015.
[2] Stevan Harnad. The symbol grounding problem. Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena,
42:335–346, 1990.
[3] M. Kiefer and L. W. Barsalou. Grounding the human conceptual system in perception,
action, and internal states. In W. Prinz, M. Beisert, and A. Herwig, editors, Action
science: Foundations of an emerging discipline, pages 381–407. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press., 2013.
[4] T. Landauer, P. Foltz, and D. Laham. Introduction to latent semantic analysis. dis-
course processes. Behav Brain Sci., 25:259–284, 1998.
[5] T. Nagel. What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4):435–450, 1974.
[6] J. R. Searle. Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and brain sciences, 3(03):417–
424, 1980.
[7] L. Steels. Grounding language through evolutionary language games. In L. Steels
and M. Hild, editors, Language Grounding in Robot, pages 1–22. New York: Springer,
2013.
[8] M. Taddeo and L. Floridi. Solving the symbol grounding problem: a critical review of
fifteen years of research. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence,
17(4):419–445, 2005.
122
